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A METHODOLOGY AND TOOLS FOR THE PROSPECTIVE IDENTIFICATION OF NEXTGEN
HUMAN FACTORS ISSUES
Ken Funk
Oregon State University
Corvallis, Oregon, USA
The Human-Machine Systems Engineering Methodology (HMSEM) is a systematic method to
prospectively identify relevant human fallibilities, potential errors, and general human factors
issues in a complex, high-risk system, then develop design recommendations for remediations to
counteract the fallibilities, avoid or mitigate the errors, and resolve the issues. HMSEM uses
IDEF0 functional modeling, task analysis, human fallibilities analysis, and Failure Modes and
Effects Analysis, organizing the information for and from the analyses in a workbook. The results
of its application to several tasks on the NextGen flight deck suggest that it can be a valuable
complement to other means to anticipate and resolve human factors issues in NextGen
development.
The problem of human performance in complex, high risk systems was described concisely, accurately, and
usefully by Wiener in the phrase, “fallible humans and vulnerable systems” (Wiener, 1987), and the Next Generation
air transportation system (NextGen) threatens to be a system highly vulnerable to the errors of its fallible human
operators. From the documentation available at this time (e.g., JPDO, 2007), NextGen appears to be a technologydriven system, not a human-centered system, and we know from past experience that technology-driven systems can
be particularly vulnerable to human error. Already, some NextGen human factors issues have been identified (e.g.,
Sheridan et al, 2006; Funk et al, 2009), but much remains to be done. The aviation human factors/psychology
community can make a valuable contribution to the development and implementation of NextGen through the
thorough and systematic identification of human factors issues. Those issues must be identified, organized, and
presented in such a way as to be understandable by and useful to NextGen system architects and engineers.
Objectives
The objectives of this project were to develop a systematic, analytical methodology to prospectively
identify human factors issues and recommend remediations, then apply the methodology to the NextGen flight deck.
Human-Machine Systems Engineering Methodology, Tools, and Application to NextGen
The result of the development, the Human-Machine Systems Engineering Methodology (HMSEM), is a
formal, systematic methodology to identify important human fallibilities relevant to a system, identify specific errors
likely to arise from the interactions of those fallibilities with characteristics of the system, identify general human
factors issues arising from the potential errors, identify remediations, and organize the findings in a way useful to
analysts, Subject Matter Experts (SMEs), system architects, and system engineers. HMSEM analysts, supported by
SMEs, work through the following stages: 1) formal functional modeling using IDEF0, 2) task analysis, 3) human
fallibilities identification, 4) Failure Modes and Effects Analysis, 5) issue identification, and 6) requirements
development. HMSEM was applied, in a test case, to the NextGen flight deck, and HMSEM and the application are
described and discussed in the remainder of this paper.
IDEF0 Modeling
Many human factors methodologies begin with some form of hierarchical task analysis (HTA), but
HMSEM requires a richer and more detailed representation of system processes (activities, functions, tasks) than
HTA typically provides. This requirement is met by modeling the system with IDEF0, a graphical language for
modeling system functions. The Oregon NextGen Flight Deck Functional Model (ONFDFM) is an IDEF0 model of
a generic NextGen commercial flight deck based on NextGen literature available at this time (e.g., JPDO, 2007) and
knowledge of present-day commercial flight deck operations. Figure 1 shows ONFDFM's top-level diagram, its
most general representation of flight deck functions.
In IDEF0, a function is a process, performed by mechanisms (humans, devices), that transforms inputs
(matter, energy, information, system states) to outputs (matter, energy, information, system states), subject to
controls (information, factors) that guide, facilitate, or constrain the process. IDEF0 uses boxes labeled with verb
phrases to represent functions and arrows labeled with noun phrases to represent mechanisms, inputs, outputs, and
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controls. So, omitting some details, Figure 1
represents that the human flight crew [h FC] and
flight deck systems (devices) [d FD systems]
perform flight deck tasks [Perform flight deck
tasks] to transform the aircraft system [s Acft] to a
managed and controlled aircraft system [s Acft,
managed & controlled]. The performance of flight
deck tasks is guided (controlled) by information in
flight deck procedures [i FD procedures] and
Federal Aviation Regulations [i FARs] and
influenced (controlled) by performance shaping
factors [f Performance shaping factors], like the
aircraft's performance limitations and the flight
crew's decision biases. To perform flight deck tasks
also transforms the flight crew's mental model [i
FC MM] to an updated mental model [i FC MM,
updated], utilizes NextGen systems [s NG systems]
and the Air Navigation Service Provider [h ANSP],
and is controlled by information received from the
NextGen system [i NG info] and the ANSP [i
Comm from ANSP].
In IDEF0, general functions are detailed or
decomposed into more specific functions, those
functions are further detailed, and the modeling
process continues until a representation sufficiently
detailed for further analysis is produced. For
example, in the ONFDFM, the function [Perform
flight deck tasks] is detailed into [Collaboratively
manage FP (flight plan)], [Manage 4DT (4dimensional trajectory)], [Manage acft (aircraft)
systems], and [Control acft]. Those are in turn
detailed, and so on. Table 1 shows a portion of the
function hierarchy of the ONFDFM, elaborating part
of the [Manage 4DT] branch. A-numbers (A#s)
define a function's place in the hierarchy (“A” for
“Activity” being inherited from IDEF0's precursor,
SADT). The hierarchy is, effectively, the task
hierarchy resulting from a typical HTA, but the
detailed IDEF0 diagrams underlying the hierarchy
bear much more information than does the typical
HTA. As shown in Table 1, the detailing of [Manage
4DT] ultimately yields [Get traffic info using
HSI/CDTI (Horizontal Situation Indicator/Cockpit
Display of Traffic Information)], part of whose
IDEF0 diagram is shown in Figure 2.

Figure 1. Top-level IDEF0 diagram of the Oregon NextGen
Flight Deck Functional Model.
Table 1. A portion of the ONFDFM function hierarchy,
elaborating the [Manage 4DT] branch.
A# Function
A0: Perform flight deck tasks
A1: Collaboratively manage FP
A2: Manage 4DT
A21: Receive ANSP clearances
A22: Assess 4DT WRT AFP & clearances
A23: Assess 4DT WRT terrain
A24: Assess 4DT WRT obstacles
A25: Assess 4DT WRT traffic
A251: Get traffic info from ANSP advisories
A252: Get traffic info from FD alerts
A253: Get traffic info using HSI/CDTI
A2531: Configure HSI to display traffic
A2532: Locate traffic symbols on CDTI
A2533: Select traffic for detailed info
A2534: Determine traffic IDs, bearings, ..., from CDTI
A2535: Estimate traffic trajectories from CDTI info
A254: Get traffic info visually
A255: Integrate traffic info
A256: Assess integrated traffic picture
A26: Adjust 4DT
A3: Manage acft systems
A4: Control acft

ONFDFM was developed using KBSI
Inc.'s AI0Win IDEF0 modeling software. An HTML
version of the full model, generated by AI0Win, is accessible at http://flightdeck.ie.orst.edu/NextGen/Models/
ONFDFM1.0/.

IDEF0 diagrams and the glossary of model elements underlying them provide a very rich representation of
the functions performed in and by a complex system. An important benefit over HTA is that IDEF0 explicitly
models not only functions (or tasks), but relationships among functions via mechanisms, inputs, outputs, and
controls. Those relationships can be identified in the IDEF0 model by examining related diagrams and tracing
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Figure 2: Detail from the IDEF0 diagram of the [Get traffic info using HSI/CDTI] function from
the ONFDFM.
arrows. However, a complex IDEF0 model may have many diagrams, and navigating them to identify relationships,
although in principle straightforward, is in practice difficult and prone to error. As in any reductionist method, it is
tempting for the analysts to focus on a small part of the IDEF0 model and ignore its context, thus to “lose the big
picture” or “miss the forest for the trees”. HMSEM uses the prototype IDEF0 Navigator (INav) to avoid that. INav
operates on an IDEF0 model providing an alternative representation to the IDEF0 diagrams. An arrow entering an
IDEF0 diagram can come from another part of the model outside the immediate diagram or from outside the system
itself. The INav representation abstracts out some of the details of the IDEF0 diagrams to show from where each
arrow (or each group of related arrows) comes or where it goes, allowing the analyst to explore details in the context
of the entire model in a single view.
Task Analysis
In HMSEM, task analysis is used to further analyze the most detailed IDEF0 functions – referred to as tasks
– to compile, from the model and elsewhere, information needed for human fallibilities identification. The analysts
enter, for example, task location and timing information into the HMSEM workbook. Table 2 shows the results of
task analysis of [A2534: Determine traffic IDs, bearings, ranges, & relative altitudes from CDTI].
Table 2. Results of the task analysis of [A2534: Determine traffic IDs, bearings, ranges, & relative altitudes from
CDTI].
Task Analysis Attribute
Purpose / Value Added
Location
Frequency & Timing
Environmental Conditions
Information Requirements
Sensory/Cognitive/Motor
Actions

Value
Necessary to detect conflicts and determine if separation and spacing is appropriate.
Flight deck
Continuous, intermittent
Darkness (red illum) to direct sunlight, glare, etc.; Noise; Vibration (low, high freq.)
i Selected traffic; i CDTI traffic symbol locations; f HSI/CDTI configuration; i FD procedures; i
FC MM; i NG surveillance info
View CDTI; Identify traffic; Estimate bearings, ranges, relative altitudes, and probable
trajectories

Human Fallibilities Identification
Human factors analysis sometimes employs a Human Error Identification (HEI) technique like SHERPA
(Embrey, 1986) to identify errors that could occur in a system. HEI techniques typically start with a functional
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representation of the system (often from HTA) and analysts and SMEs, referring to that representation, use their
knowledge and experience to hypothesize potential errors that could occur in specific tasks. HEI techniques rely
heavily on analyst and SME memory and judgment (and, one could say, serendipity) to compile a comprehensive list
of likely errors and are, therefore, subject to the same kinds of limitations that affect human performance in systems
like the one they are studying. Rather than to attempt to identify errors directly, HMSEM first identifies the human
fallibilities likely to be significant in each task and, from system and task information from the IDEF0 model and
task analysis, proceeds to project errors that could occur as a result of those fallibilities interacting with system and
task characteristics.
HMSEM uses the Human Fallibilities Identification and Remediation Database (HFIRDB) for fallibilities
identification. The HFIRDB is a database consisting of human fallibilities and remediations for them compiled from
Wickens' and Hollands' Engineering Psychology and Human Performance (Wickens & Hollands, 2000). The user
interface leads the analysts through a series of questions about each task to be analyzed for fallibilities and errors
and the analysts refer to the IDEF0 model and the task analysis to answer them. The HFIRDB first asks the analysts
to select from among seven information processing stages (i.e., sensory registration, perception, attention allocation,
working memory, long-term memory, decision-making, and response control) those employed in the task under
consideration. Next the analysts are asked to choose general human fallibility categories (e.g., visual display
processing or working memory limitations) that apply to the selected information processing stages. Then HFIRDB
asks the analysts to choose from a list of possibilities just those conditions that exist in the task under consideration.
For example, that operators must appropriately allocate attention to concurrently process or selectively attend to
visual stimuli presented in displays is a condition necessary for visual display processing fallibilities to be relevant.
The HFIRDB uses a series of queries to produce a list of human fallibilities that may manifest themselves in
performance of the task, such as the sensitivity-related vigilance decrement, the tendency for operator performance
to degrade during vigilance tasks as a result of a decrease in sensitivity level. The HFIRDB then asks the analysts to
confirm task conditions that enable manifestation of the fallibilities and a complete list of relevant fallibilities is
generated, which may be copied into the HMSEM workbook for the next analysis stage.
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is an analytic technique used to prospectively identify the
ways in which a system can fail. FMEA begins with a process or functional description of the system to be analyzed.
For each function, the analysts use knowledge of the function to identify failure modes, that is, ways in which it
could fail to achieve its intended outcome. For each failure mode, the analysts identify the causes of or contributing
factors to the failure mode, and try to predict its consequences. To prioritize the failure modes for further study or
remediation, the analysts assign numeric ratings as to the severity of the consequences of the failure mode, the
probability or expected frequency of its occurrence, and the likelihood that it would not be detected in time to avoid
the consequences. These three ratings are multiplied to give a Risk Priority Number (RPN) for each failure mode
and the RPNs are used to prioritize the failure modes for further analysis or remediation.
In HMSEM, FMEA is used to identify potential operator errors as failure modes. The analysts use the
IDEF0 model, operator fallibilities identified with the help of the HFIRDB, and general domain and human factors
knowledge to identify specific failure modes – i.e., operator errors – that could occur in performing the task as a
result of the interaction of system and task characteristics with those fallibilities. These are entered into the HMSEM
workbook. Table 3 presents some results from FMEA applied to the task [A2534: Determine traffic IDs, bearings,
ranges, & relative altitudes from CDTI].
Issue Identification
To identify issues, the HMSEM analysts collect similar failure modes and those related by common fallibilities and
task characteristics. For each such collection, the analysts compose a statement which, if it is or should become true
in the implementation and operation of the system, describes a condition or situation related to system operations
where natural human characteristics, capabilities, limitations, and tendencies are very likely to lead to significant
problems with system effectiveness, efficiency, or safety. These issues are added to the HMSEM workbook. Table 4
presents some NextGen flight deck failure modes and general issues arising from them.
Requirements Development
Perhaps hundreds of human factors issues related to the NextGen flight deck may be identified in this and
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Negative skill transfer

Strategic taskmanagement bias

Potential Effects of
Failure Mode

Nondetect.

Potential Failure Mode

Probability

Human_Fallibility
Perceptual competition

Other
Contributing
Factor(s)

Severity

Table 3. Excerpts from the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis of the task, [A2534: Determine traffic IDs, bearings,
ranges, & relative altitudes from CDTI].

RPN

High symbol
density on
HSI/CDTI

MM error: FC confuses two CDTI traffic
symbols, mis-estimates
bearing/range/altitude/trajectory of one
or both.

Inaccurate perception
and projection of traffic
bearing/range/altitude/t
rajectory, loss of
separation/spacing.

5

4

5

100

CDTI display
format,
symbology differ
from those of
similar
equipment.
Other highpriority,
concurrent
tasks/stimuli.

MM error: FC misinterprets CDTI traffic Inaccurate perception
and projection of traffic
info, mis-estimates
bearing/range/altitude/t
bearing/range/altitude/trajectory.
rajectory, loss of
separation/spacing.

5

4

4

80

TM error: FC fixates on CDTI, fails to
perform other high-priority tasks.

4

5

4

80

Other tasks ignored or
performed poorly.

Table 4. Some general issues identified by analysis of the NextGen flight deck.
Related Failure Modes
Miss: FC misses traffic on CDTI.

In Task(s)
A2532

Delay: CDTI scan is prolonged. Miss: FC fixates
on one region of CDTI, misses other traffic.

A2532

mistake: FC chooses and sets HSI/CDTI to
inappropriate config.

A2531

A2531,
slip: FC sets HSI/CDTI to unintended config.
A2534
lapse: FC omits step to properly configure
HSI/CDTI. MM error: FC misinterprets CDTI traffic
info, mis-estimates
bearing/range/altitude/trajectory.

Resulting General Issue
The flight crew's CDTI traffic detection performance
decreases over long periods of self-separation authority.
The effectiveness and efficiency of the flight crew's CDTI
traffic scan is very susceptible to stress and other
performance-shaping factors and performance can suffer as
a result.
Complex device configuration procedures induce pilots to
select suboptimal configurations, leading to diminished
performance when the devices are used.
Attempting to perform two or more tasks that require the
same mental resources concurrently causes the
performance of at least one of them to be diminished,

other ways, but unless guidance is given to avert the potential effectiveness, efficiency, and safety problems they
raise, merely citing them is of little value. Here is an opportunity for aviation human factors scientists and
practitioners to go the next step toward solution. In addition to human fallibilities information, the HFIRDB contains
general guidance information for remediations to reduce the likelihood that human fallibilities will interact with
system and task characteristics to manifest themselves as errors. With fallibility, failure mode, error, and issue
information from the HMSEM workbook, the analysts may turn again to the HFIRDB to retrieve countermeasures it
suggests to counteract the fallibilities. Table 5 presents some suggested requirements for the NextGen flight deck.
Following requirements engineering convention, terms and phrases enclosed in asterisks (* ... *) are, for the time
being, ambiguous and unverifiable. Further analysis, and possibly research, will be required to refine them.
Discussion
HMSEM is prospective, systematic, and is based on validated human factors knowledge. Moreover, its use
of a rich functional modeling formalism provides a framework to organize human fallibilities, potential errors,
human factors issues, and recommendations or requirements in a way compatible with the functional models used by
system architects and engineers. It thus offers a natural way for human factors scientists and engineers to collaborate
with system designers in the critical early stages of system development. But HMSEM has important limitations. In
its present form, it is a time-consuming process. Most HMSEM tools are presently in the prototype stage. Despite its
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Table 5. Some preliminary NextGen flight deck requirements to address issues identified in
HMSEM analysis. Asterisks (* ... *) denote as-yet unverifiable terms.
A#
A0
A253

A2532

Requirement
Type
NextGen flight crews shall receive concurrent task management training,
Training
including *topics TBD*.
CDTI traffic symbol visual coding, for whatever purpose, shall *manifest* exactly Equipment
three levels of salience corresponding to the three levels of traffic priority: low
for the symbols of normal priority traffic, medium for symbols of intermediate
priority traffic, and high for symbols of high priority traffic.
CDTI procedures shall *recommend or specify* a *systematic* display scan
Procedures
pattern that covers the entire display each cycle and which cycle is completed
in no more than *C* seconds.

attempt to be systematic, its application is still subject to analyst biases and analyst knowledge and cognitive
limitations. Its application to NextGen, described in this paper, is limited in scope to a few tasks related to CDTIbased traffic awareness. The functional model itself is limited in scope and based on as-yet very limited
documentation on the envisioned NextGen flight deck.
Recommendations
Therefore, the knowledge base of the HFIRDB should be expanded to address more dimensions of human
performance and the HMSEM workbook should be converted to a more robust software tool that integrates the other
tools, provides a repository for findings, and generates publishable reports. A team of human factors analysts, SMEs,
and engineers should be assembled to continue applying HMSEM to NextGen. They should refine and expand the
ONFDFM to incorporate the most recent plans for NextGen implementation, modeling, in detail, the full scope of
flight deck functions. They should use the model and refined tools to identify human fallibilities, potential errors,
and human factors issues, and make recommendations for engineering requirements to guide NextGen system
design. Throughout this process, the team should work with NextGen system architects and engineers to make the
ONFDFM consistent with functional models used for NextGen development, to utilize the latest NextGen plans in
their analyses, and to organize and present their findings in a way compatible with NextGen design documents. In
this way, human factors analysis and recommendations will be more likely to have greater impact on NextGen.
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